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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5552  
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5601  
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 5901  
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1112  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3920  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5224  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1282  
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 3351  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2589  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000740

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [IN](#) [NP](#)

SUBJECT: FORMER PM TO INDIA TO ASCERTAIN FATE OF MONARCHY

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

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¶1. (C) On April 9, Royal confidant Prabhakar SJB Rana told the Ambassador that Former Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa would travel to New Delhi soon to confer with top Indian political leaders about the fate of Nepal's monarchy and the country's uncertain future. Rana requested that the Ambassador lean on the Indians to tone down their rhetoric regarding the necessity of a June 20 Constituent Assembly election. Rana and the Ambassador agreed that, in the last month, the Indian position on the situation in Nepal had been inconsistent. When questioned by the Ambassador, Rana stated he had advised the King against making a Nepali New Year's Day (April 14) address and had told him to consult with the Prime Minister. The Ambassador noted that any statement by the King would likely help the Maoists.

Thapa To Assess Indian Support For Monarchy

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¶2. (C) Royal confidant Prabhakar SJB Rana told the Ambassador April 9 that Rastriya Janashakti Party Chief and former Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa would visit New Delhi soon. Thapa would meet with Indian leaders from all the parties, including Sonia Gandhi, to determine whether King Gyanendra had any remaining support. Rana told the Ambassador that Thapa would return with a full picture of the Indian sentiment regarding King Gyanendra's future. Rana stated that if Gyanendra had little support in India (and both Rana and Thapa believed this was the case), Thapa intended to gather together a group of former prime ministers to suggest abdication to the King.

Thapa To Deliver Message Of Concern

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¶3. (C) Rana stated that Thapa also planned to send a message to the Indians that the future of Nepal was at risk, as the Maoists would continue to use any and all means available to gain complete political control of the country. Rana noted that Thapa believed the Interim Government could not survive and that the Maoists were posed to take over. Rana and the Ambassador agreed that it was apparent from their speeches that the Maoists did not support a "bourgeois parliamentary

democracy;" rather their goal remained the establishment of a Maoists-controlled state.

#### India Should Soften Stance

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¶4. (C) Rana requested that the Ambassador lean on the Government of India to soften its insistence on a June 20 Constituent Assembly election. The Ambassador responded that he would be meeting with Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee later on April 9 to discuss India's unexplained and sudden change in position on Maoist entry into the Interim Government. Rana commented that the central government in New Delhi had apparently lost control over Indian policy in the Terai to the state governments in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (two northern Indian provinces bordering Nepal) and that India's sudden policy reversal might be explained by her internal politics. He also noted that the Indian Foreign Minister had stated that the Madhesi problem was Nepal's problem, but had then offered India's support for the Madhesis, reaffirming the groups' demands. Rana and the Ambassador agreed that pushing for June 20 Constituent Assembly election without addressing the Madhesi movement in the Terai was a dangerous combination.

#### King Threatens New Year's Day Address

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¶5. (C) The Ambassador questioned Rana about rumors that the King would deliver a New Year's Day message. (Note: The Nepali New Year begins on April 14. End note.) Rana stated that he had advised the King that such an address would be a bad idea. He suggested that the King consult with the Prime

KATHMANDU 00000740 002 OF 002

Minister. The Ambassador noted that he could not imagine any address by the King which would not help the Maoists. Rana hoped that the Prime Minister would not allow the King to deliver a New Year's address.

#### Comment

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¶6. (C) Although it seems unlikely that Thapa will find support for the King anywhere in India, no one is willing to bet on abdication. The King has been advised before to keep a low profile and start planning an exit strategy. He has a history of ignoring such advice. We can only hope that he does not attempt a provocative New Year's Day address on April 14. The only beneficiaries would be the Maoists, who would seize such an opportunity to press anew for abolition of the monarchy.

MORIARTY